Posts tagged ‘Pakistan’

The Entrepreneurship test

kid selling stuffPeace everyone.

With more and more young, educated people joining the rat race every day, startups are the order of the day. despite over 16-20 years of schooling and professional education, its sad to note that not even one institution of the world trains people on how to start their own work. We are all taught how to be compliant, acceptable pieces of machinery that help the rich get richer each day.

Some basics of how/when/where to start a company are given below, it is hoped that it will benefit the reader in planning out  what is practically possible and what’s not. Its also a test, in terms of state of mind. Most of us don’t have the right reasons to start something commercial, which is why it blows up in our faces more often than not. So lets start with ten basic yes/no questions that all of us should ask ourselves before doing something on our own.

 

The TEN ‘yesses’ needed to enter entrepreneurship mode

1. Do you actually want to start something that will be completely dependent on you and no one else, for the rest of your life?

2. Aside from academics, do you have the practical experience of running something commercially viable in your business vertical? – simple version – Can you make it work all by yourself?

3. Are you financially capable of surviving the gestation period of your business (6 to 12 months)? Simple version – can you go without making a dime for a year?

4. Are you good at making your own decisions and seeing them through, regardless of the outcome, positive or negative?

5. Are you satisfied with what you are currently making with your current employment/commercial scenario?

6.In case you intend to borrow investments, have you ever taken a loan from someone that is 10 times greater (or more) than your monthly income potential, and paid it back within the agreed term?

7. are you good with numbers?

8. are you good with words? can you read /write /communicate perfectly well in at least one major tongue in your region?

9. are you aware of the legal/commercial rules and regulations applicable on your region of operation?

10. Can you make your start-up your number one priority (over family, friends and loved ones, sleep, food, entertainment etc) for the next one year?

 

In case any of the above is a ‘no’, or even ‘maybe’, wait until its a confirmed yes. Might take a while, but its better that way. An explanation of the questions is given below (for people who might not be sure regarding the answers).

 

1. Commitment - Your company/start-up is like a child, it cannot survive without you. once it is on its feet, its like a beautiful woman that no one other than you will be sincere with. Because its yours, not theirs. you know the rest :) So, don’t get into it if you cant commit to it for life.

2.  Expertise and Experience- If you don’t know how its done, stop fooling yourself that it will work. Even if it does, those that make it work will take it over, sooner or later. To retain authority, you need to be the best at what your’e doing. also, you need zero dependencies on people, from start to finish. You need to know how to do EVERYTHING yourself, so if in case someone leaves you down the road, your hands are not tied. This is why it is always recommended to work at least 5 to 10 years in the same business vertical before starting on your own.

As an example: the most successful businessmen in this world are jews and memons (a cast in karachi). Memons have a basic principle that they always have their children start their own businesses at age 20 or less, AFTER having them work at the root level (teller, clerk, accountant, shopkeeper etc) for at least 5 years in a business that DOES NOT belong to their parents directly. Similarly, you wont see Bill gates JR. in microsoft, or Jobs JR in apple etc. An Entrepreneur is self made, merit based. A son running his father’s business is a safe, employee mindset.

3.  Financials - perhaps the biggest mistake all start-ups make, they assume they’ll start making money instantly. If its not financially well timed, even the best business model will flop. Nothing works without money, not even your relationship with your parents :) . If you need money every month to ‘pay the bills’, you cant start something on your own, until you’ve hedged up at least an years worth of running finance.

4. Perseverance/leadership -  entrepreneurship is not for gullible people. You need to be obstinate, convincing and influencing, an individual that walks their path through even if they have to do it alone. If you’re not, don’t try to take up this responsibility. People can only follow a leader if he can follow his own set direction himself. People that switch plans mid-way, or go around in circles/are impulsive – they are better off finding someone they can follow. examples, Martin Luther King/Abraham Lincoln are leaders, Britney Spears/Michael Jackson are not (and never will be, despite being more popular among people).

5. Commercial viability - second biggest mistake – people make start-ups because they believe ‘they’re not getting paid enough’. By making a start-up you’re actually putting yourself in a  more severe position. When employed, you just had to convince one person to pay you more (your boss) – which did not happen. Now you’ll be at the mercy of 8 billion people, good luck :) . You can only make money in this world if you know how to get what you want in life, and it starts with negotiating a good employment deal. Anyone that can’t do that will never be able to do better as an entrepreneur. Also, you always make more for less effort in an employment. So if the objective is to make a lot of money and have a good time without working too hard, stay employed :)

6. Investments -  Third biggest issue (if you make it this far). Preferably, do it all yourself. if not, know who to involve and who not to. There’s no such thing as a ‘sleeping partner’, they only sleep until you go profitable, then they will grow brains and try to tell you what to do. Scale down your business, try to make a profit on a small amount first. once you have a cash cycle done/proof of concept completed, magnify the scale (ideally using the money you make from the business/your own investment). As an example, i’ve started 3 companies before my current one, and I’ve had to leave all of them after making them profitable owing to the fact that i had ‘sleeping partners’ financing me. Its only your business if its your own money, else its everybody’s business, in which you’re ‘somewhat employed’.

Its also advised that you have some experience of paying back on time , before starting a company. An example would be paying for an asset bought on instalments (you should be comfortable tightening your belt to pay back money you’ve borrowed in the past). If you’re not , you’ll just keep borrowing more and will never be out of debt.

A guy that makes 1000 PKR and saves 50 after running a rickshaw all day is richer than a guy that makes 1 Mill PKR and spends 2 million, and owes 3 million in debt already. Money doesn’t disappear into thin air, neither does it grow on trees. if you take money, you will have to pay it back, sooner or later. If you don’t, you’ll lose something equivalent. The financial institutions/people around you with money are not stupid, and they did not get rich by giving out money to random people and never asking back for it :)

7. Numbers -  the only absolute truth in our world is numbers. If you’re not good with numbers – join a math class somewhere. Don’t start a business (unless you want people to fleece you everyday). Musicians/celebrities are never good with numbers. which is why they are always under debt. which is why MJ lost everything, even after death. Not even one of his songs (or even one of his jackets) is his own property, every hair on his head was property of record labels. despite grossing more money than Berkshire Hathaway makes in an year, he never made it to even the fortune top 100 all his life. MJ as an individual= financial wreck.

8.Words -  Communication is needed, esp. written. verbal doesn’t count as much as written, but you need to be a man/woman of your word. Unless you can put things in writing (and abide by them), you can’t run a business. You also should be able to explain things to people, make them see reason in your words (not artificially, actually). Go by logic, not assertions. Sweet talk is a positive, provided its used in a positive context. People like being praised. But they are not stupid, they can see through empty words. They just don’t show it until they find an alternative.

9. Legal/rules/reg

Know how to start a business in a legal/morally accurate way.  Dont screw over your employers in the process. If you do, your employees will do the same later :) . Know the exact legal implications of your business and do everything legit. All the legit businessmen of the world are still the top 10 richest people, which is a clear indication of the fact that white money has more volume than black. I don’t know about other verticals, but having worked in software for 13 years now, I can tell you that you can make more money as a the CEO of a legit software company, than you can as the President of Pakistan :)

10. Priorities - Perhaps not a business killer, but screwed up priorities can hamper the growth of a business. The reason why everyone is not Steve jobs is that Steve destroyed a marriage and his health making Apple what it is today. Most of us lose impetus when the money starts coming in, and we start focusing on ‘where to spend the money’ rather than taking the business further. We start buying expensive things like property, gadgets, sports cars, doing world travel trips, dating expensive women, booze, parties etc. That’s not what we set out to do. If it is, we could’ve done much better doing it in someone else’s company. Screwing over your own creation just to have a good time is not justified.

Why entrepreneurship

The core reason (which we often lose sight of) why every one feels like doing something on their own is to prove that they can do it BETTER than its being done. Focus on that. If you’re starting a company just to become what you set out to prove wrong (exploitation of workforce wages, wrong processes, favouritism, owners taking massive cuts out of gross etc),  its better not to do it altogether. The world already has its fair share of screwed up companies that are screwing working, capable people like you to make the rich richer. It does not need more firms like that.

I’d like to close this with the mission statement from Engro Corp. – which is ‘To improve the quality of life of people around us’. +- pros and cons, Engro does what it can to make that happen. The world would be a much better place with more companies like that. Our gift of knowledge can be used to help make people’s lives better, esp. people like the kid in the photo (he’s an entrepreneur too, one exploited by the self interest of others). Lets do what we can to get him the quality of life he deserves.

Comments/questions welcome.

z

The Taliban and Osama- In Focus

Peace everyone – just the facts, about the Taliban. Please refrain from trying to prove that they are working towards the betterment of Islam. The root level people are manipulated, and the top brass is sold out. Both the deceiver and the deceived (which includes people who think that the Taliban are doing this for Islam) are equal in blame.

This is a video you wont find anywhere else.  Its an inside leak of Hilary Clinton, from amongst the democrats, around 1 year ago. If anyone still thinks that calling the Taliban a US tool is a conspiracy, then i’m sorry to say, that the truth is not for people who close their eyes to it, just to sleep better at night.

“But that was Afghanistan, this is isn’t Afghanistan, Taliban are good people now, they are fighting for Jihad, US has abandoned them”.  LOL, people really are clueless. Taliban are mercenaries, born to fight- we need oxygen to live, they need bloodshed. And there is no guarantee on a person’s allegiance who behaves in this manner. When they can do it once, they can do it again.

Manipulated or real mercenaries, they are causing an equivalent amount of damage to Pakistan in both cases, just by being here, even if they are doing absolutely nothing(which is not the case, as you will learn as we head further into the discussion).

Osama Bin Laden

CIA’s most wanted man (actually hes their trump card, their excuse to invasion of Muslim countries). He is alive, and well, and will continue to do so until most Muslim territories are under US occupation. Here the complete history on Bin Laden, facts, compiled by westerners themselves, who have the brains and the willpower to expose their OWN government, and we are still willing to believe that Osama is fighting in Islam’s cause. He is no more than a mere puppet being manipulated by circumstances, intentions be good or evil. Its no use having good intentions and fucking up the universe in the process of your actions.

Lets start with a  video concocted by the NSA, in which Osama accepts responsiblity for 9/11. Two agents standing beside him(Osama OR his lookalike, sports watches, black suits, papers change hands behind Osama) and several other minor bloopers put the authenticity of the video in question. Unfortunately, he has never denied responsibility of 9/11. half the US has acknowledged that it was an inside job, (hence the non republican govt. elected, 2008) but Muslims still like to believe that Osama did it, lol. The only denial was published by al jazeera in a radio interview, link given.

http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/

Do read it this through, this research paper is 7 years old, but we are still in doubt about Osama’s allegiance and competence, 8 years later. I am indifferent to his intentions, its his severe lack of competence that I’m concerned about. Why should Muslims have such dip-shit leadership that does not even know he basic rules of engagement in Islam, and cant even counter fake acceptance videos. when I can have a website and publish 7 articles/videos a week, why cant the ‘noble osama’ come out on the web and say hes not done it? Why cant he train another leader, and surrender himself to save millions of Muslim lives?

Why should we follow people who cannot see through western policies to know that they’re being used (if they’ve not been paid already). I’ll tell you why they dont see through them, because they dont intend to counter the policies of their paycheck makers.

—————————–begins——————————————————–

How the CIA created Osama bin Laden
BY NORM DIXON ©, 19 September 2001

This article first appeared in Green Left Weekly, Australia’s leading leftwing newspaper. Posted with permission of the author.

“Throughout the world … its agents, client states and satellites gay videos are on the defensive — on the moral defensive, the intellectual defensive, and the political and economic defensive. Freedom movements arise and assert themselves. They’re doing so on almost every continent populated by man — in the hills of Afghanistan, in Angola, in Kampuchea, in Central America … [They are] freedom fighters.”

Is this a call to jihad (holy war) taken from one of Islamic fundamentalist Osama bin Laden’s notorious fatwas? Or perhaps a communique issued by the repressive Taliban regime in Kabul?

In fact, this glowing praise of the murderous exploits of today’s supporters of arch-terrorist bin Laden and his Taliban collaborators, and their holy war against the “evil empire”, was issued by US President Ronald Reagan on March 8, 1985. The “evil empire” was the Soviet Union, as well as Third World movements fighting US-backed colonialism, apartheid and dictatorship.

How things change. In the aftermath of a series of terrorist atrocities — the most despicable being the mass murder of more than 6000 working people in New York and Washington on September 11 — bin Laden the “freedom fighter” is now lambasted by US leaders and the Western mass media as a “terrorist mastermind” and an “evil-doer”.

Yet the US government refuses to admit its central role in creating the vicious movement that spawned bin Laden, the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists that plague Algeria and Egypt — and perhaps the disaster that befell New York.

The mass media has also downplayed the origins of bin Laden and his toxic brand of Islamic fundamentalism.

Mujaheddin
In April 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in reaction to a crackdown against the party by that country’s repressive government.

The PDPA was committed to a radical land reform that favoured the peasants, trade union rights, an expansion of education and social services, equality for women and the separation of church and state. The PDPA also supported strengthening Afghanistan’s relationship with the Soviet Union.
Such policies enraged the wealthy semi-feudal landlords, the Muslim religious establishment (many mullahs were also big landlords) and the tribal chiefs. They immediately began organizing resistance to the government’s progressive policies, under the guise of defending Islam.
Washington, fearing the spread of Soviet influence (and worse the new government’s radical example) to its allies in Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf states, immediately offered support to the Afghan mujaheddin, as the “contra” force was known.

Following an internal PDPA power struggle in December 1979 which toppled Afghanistan’s leader, thousands of Soviet troops entered the country to prevent the new government’s fall. This only galvanized the disparate fundamentalist factions. Their reactionary jihad now gained legitimacy as a “national liberation” struggle in the eyes of many Afghans.

The Soviet Union was eventually to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989 and the mujaheddin captured the capital, Kabul, in 1992.

Between 1978 and 1992, the US government poured at least US$6 billion (some estimates range as high as $20 billion) worth of arms, training and funds to prop up the mujaheddin factions. Other Western governments, as well as oil-rich Saudi Arabia, kicked in as much again. Wealthy Arab fanatics, like Osama bin Laden, provided millions more.

Washington’s policy in Afghanistan was shaped by US President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and was continued by his successors. His plan went far beyond simply forcing Soviet troops to withdraw; rather it aimed to foster an international movement to spread Islamic fanaticism into the Muslim Central Asian Soviet republics to destabilize the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski’s grand plan coincided with Pakistan military dictator General Zia ul-Haq’s own ambitions to dominate the region. US-run Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe beamed Islamic fundamentalist tirades across Central Asia (while paradoxically denouncing the “Islamic revolution” that toppled the pro-US Shah of Iran in 1979).

Washington’s favoured mujaheddin faction was one of the most extreme, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The West’s distaste for terrorism did not apply to this unsavory “freedom fighter”. Hekmatyar was notorious in the 1970′s for throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil.

After the mujaheddin took Kabul in 1992, Hekmatyar’s forces rained US-supplied missiles and rockets on that city — killing at least 2000 civilians — until the new government agreed to give him the post of prime minister. Osama bin Laden was a close associate of Hekmatyar and his faction.
Hekmatyar was also infamous for his side trade in the cultivation and trafficking in opium. Backing of the mujaheddin from the CIA coincided with a boom in the drug business. Within two years, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the world’s single largest source of heroin, supplying 60% of US drug users.

In 1995, the former director of the CIA’s operation in Afghanistan was unrepentant about the explosion in the flow of drugs: “Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets… There was a fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.”

Made in the USA
According to Ahmed Rashid, a correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, in 1986 CIA chief William Casey committed CIA support to a long-standing ISI proposal to recruit from around the world to join the Afghan jihad. At least 100,000 Islamic militants flocked to Pakistan between 1982 and 1992 (some 60,000 attended fundamentalist schools in Pakistan without necessarily taking part in the fighting).

John Cooley, a former journalist with the US ABC television network and author of Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, has revealed that Muslims recruited in the US for the mujaheddin were sent to Camp Peary, the CIA’s spy training camp in Virginia, where young Afghans, Arabs from Egypt and Jordan, and even some African-American “black Muslims” were taught “sabotage skills”.

The November 1, 1998, British Independent reported that one of those charged with the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Ali Mohammed, had trained “bin Laden’s operatives” in 1989.

These “operatives” were recruited at the al Kifah Refugee Centre in Brooklyn, New York, given paramilitary training in the New York area and then sent to Afghanistan with US assistance to join Hekmatyar’s forces. Mohammed was a member of the US army’s elite Green Berets.

The program, reported the Independent, was part of a Washington-approved plan called “ Operation Cyclone”.  In Pakistan, recruits, money and equipment were distributed to the mujaheddin factions by an organization known as Maktab al Khidamar (Office of Services — MAK).
MAK was a front for Pakistan’s CIA, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate. The ISI was the first recipient of the vast bulk of CIA and Saudi Arabian covert assistance for the Afghan contras. Bin Laden was one of three people who ran MAK. In 1989, he took overall charge of MAK.
Among those trained by Mohammed were El Sayyid Nosair, who was jailed in 1995 for killing Israeli rightist Rabbi Meir Kahane and plotting with others to bomb New York landmarks, including the World Trade Center in 1993.
The Independent also suggested that Shiekh Omar Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian religious leader also milf videos jailed for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, was also part of Operation Cyclone. He entered the US in 1990 with the CIA’s approval. A confidential CIA report concluded that the agency was “partly culpable” for the 1993 World Trade Center blast, the Independent reported.

Bin Laden
Osama bin Laden, one of 20 sons of a billionaire construction magnate, arrived in Afghanistan to join the jihad in 1980. An austere religious fanatic and business tycoon, bin Laden specialized in recruiting, financing and training the estimated 35,000 non-Afghan mercenaries who joined the mujaheddin.

The bin Laden family is a prominent pillar of the Saudi Arabian ruling class, with close personal, financial and political ties to that country’s pro-US royal family.

Bin Laden senior was appointed Saudi Arabia’s minister of public works as a favour by King Faisal. The new minister awarded his own construction companies lucrative contracts to rebuild Islam’s holiest mosques in Mecca and Medina. In the process, the bin Laden family company in 1966 became the world’s largest private construction company.

Osama bin Laden’s father died in 1968. Until 1994, he had access to the dividends from this ill-gotten business empire.

(Bin Laden junior’s oft-quoted personal fortune of US$200-300 million has been arrived at by the US State Department by dividing today’s value of the bin Laden family net worth — estimated to be US$5 billion — by the number of bin Laden senior’s sons. A fact rarely mentioned is that in 1994 the bin Laden family disowned Osama and took control of his share.)

Osama’s military and business adventures in Afghanistan had the blessing of the bin Laden dynasty and the reactionary Saudi Arabian regime. His close working relationship with MAK also meant that the CIA was fully aware of his activities.

Milt Bearden, the CIA’s station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989, admitted to the January 24, 2000, New Yorker that while he never personally met bin Laden, “Did I know that he was out there? Yes, I did … [Guys like] bin Laden were bringing $20-$25 million a month from other Saudis and Gulf Arabs to underwrite the war. And that is a lot of money. It’s an extra $200-$300 million a year. And this is what bin Laden did.”

In 1986, bin Laden brought heavy construction equipment from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. Using his extensive knowledge of construction techniques (he has a degree in civil engineering), he built “training camps”, some dug deep into the sides of mountains, and built roads to reach them.

These camps, now dubbed “terrorist universities” by Washington, were built in collaboration with the ISI and the CIA. The Afghan contra fighters, including the tens of thousands of mercenaries recruited and paid for by bin Laden, were armed by the CIA. Pakistan, the US and Britain provided military trainers.

Tom Carew, a former British SAS soldier who secretly fought for the mujaheddin told the August 13, 2000, British Observer, “The Americans were keen to teach the Afghans the techniques of urban terrorism — car bombing and so on — so that they could strike at the Russians in major towns … Many of them are now using their knowledge and expertise to wage war on everything they hate.”

Al Qaeda (the Base), bin Laden’s organization, was established in 1987-88 to run the camps and other business enterprises. It is a tightly-run capitalist holding company — albeit one that integrates the operations of a mercenary force and related logistical services with “legitimate” business operations.
Bin Laden has simply continued to do the job he was asked to do in Afghanistan during the 1980′s — fund, feed and train mercenaries. All that has changed is his primary customer. Then it was the ISI and, behind the scenes, the CIA. Today, his services are utilized primarily by the reactionary Taliban regime.

Bin Laden only became a “terrorist” in US eyes when he fell out with the Saudi royal family over its decision to allow more than 540,000 US troops to be stationed on Saudi soil following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

When thousands of US troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the end of the Gulf War, bin Laden’s anger turned to outright opposition. He declared that Saudi Arabia and other regimes — such as Egypt — in the Middle East were puppets of the US, just as the PDPA government of Afghanistan had been a puppet of the Soviet Union.

He called for the overthrow of these client regimes and declared it the duty of all Muslims to drive the US out of the Gulf states. In 1994, he was stripped of his Saudi citizenship and forced to leave the country. His assets there were frozen.

After a period in Sudan, he returned to Afghanistan in May 1996. He refurbished the camps he had helped build during the Afghan war and offered the facilities and services — and thousands of his mercenaries — to the Taliban, which took power that September.

Today, bin Laden’s milf porn private army of non-Afghan religious fanatics is a key prop of the Taliban regime.

Prior to the devastating September 11 attack on the twin towers of World Trade Center, US ruling-class figures remained unrepentant about the consequences of their dirty deals with the likes of bin Laden, Hekmatyar and the Taliban. Since the awful attack, they have been downright hypocritical.
In an August 28, 1998, report posted on MSNBC, Michael Moran quotes Senator Orrin Hatch, who was a senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee which approved US dealings with the mujaheddin, as saying he would make “the same call again”, even knowing what bin Laden would become.

“It was worth it. Those were very important, pivotal matters that played an important role in the downfall of the Soviet Union.”

————————————-ends—————————————————

Inference

Personally, I see a similar USSR type (but on a shorter scale) funded campaign against Pakistan, where our fundamentalist groups are fed factual bullshit about how our govt. is not acting upon Islam, and are funded to destabilize it. On the other hand, the govt. is counterfunded to help eradicate these US produced extremists. Result, chaos in the country, which ultimately becomes a reason for surrendering nuclear capability, or an all out invasion if we end up fucking stuff up at the international media level. Why does the US need Pakistan’s territory?

This is another story: http://factfilez.com/?p=51

Wake up to it guys, and stop calling it a ‘conspiracy theory’, just to sleep better at night.

The solution is to pass this info to ALL people living int he NWFP, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. The solution is to do a compelte overhaul of our crony maulvis and govt. People at the root level, me n you, will do it, once we are all on the same page. As long as some of us think this is a ‘conspiracy theory’, things will never change.

comments/questions more than welcome.

z

The Kerry Lugar Bill- Prosperity or gold plated shackles for Pakistan

The following is a summary of some sections of what the Kerry Lugar bill dictates for the future of Pakistan. It is up to tJohn Kerryhe reader to decide whether it actually implies prosperity for the nation, or is it another intrusion lesbian videos by the western powers like the East India company from the 19th century. In the wake of its developments, even before its acceptance, Private mercenary agencies including Blackwater and US armed troops have already begun deployment within our capital, following which the GHQ of our military was attacked less than a month later. Co-incidence?

Feed taken lesbian porn from thenews.com.pk

Original link:

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=200156

THE KERRY LUGAR BILL

S.1707

ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ACT OF 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN gay porn ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC).


Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009